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ABSTRACT
Recent literature on computational notions of fairness has been
broadly divided into two distinct camps, supporting interventions
that address either individual-based or group-based fairness. Rather
than privilege a single denition, we seek to resolve both within
the particular domain of employment discrimination. To this end,
we construct a dual labor market model composed of a Tempo-
rary Labor Market, in which rm strategies are constrained to en-
sure group-level fairness, and a Permanent LaborMarket, in which
individual worker fairness is guaranteed. We show that such re-
strictions on hiring practices induces an equilibrium that Pareto-
dominates those arising from strategies that employ statistical dis-
crimination or a “group-blind” criterion. Individual worker repu-
tations produce externalities for collective reputation, generating
a feedback loop termed a “self-fullling prophecy.” Our model pro-
duces its own feedback loop, raising the collective reputation of
an initially disadvantaged group via a fairness intervention that
need not be permanent. Moreover, we show that, contrary to pop-
ular assumption, the asymmetric equilibria resulting from hiring
practices that disregard group-fairness may be immovable without
targeted intervention. e enduring nature of such equilibria that
are both inequitable and Pareto inecient suggest that fairness in-
terventions are of critical importance in moving the labor market
to be more socially just and ecient.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Work in the growing eld of algorithmic fairness proposes inter-
ventions of discretion on algorithmic decision-makers when issues
of bias and discrimination are potentially at stake. e literature
is varied but may be broadly categorized as either proposing so-
lutions that defend fairness at the individual level (similar indi-
viduals are treated similarly) [1] or at the group level (groups are
awarded proportional representation) [2, 3]. is paper constructs
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a model of discrimination in the labor market along with fairness
constraints that address both notions of fairness.
As we focus on the particular domain of labor market dynam-
ics, our paper draws upon an extensive literature in economics.
e theory of statistical discrimination, originally set forth in two
seminar papers by Phelps [4] and Arrow [5], explains group-unfair
outcomes as the result of rational agent behaviors that lock a sys-
tem into an unfavorable equilibrium. In the basic model, workers
compete for a skilled job with wage w . Skill acquisition requires
workers to expend an investment cost of c , which is distributed
according to a function F . us, a worker’s investment decision is
an assessment of her expected wage gain compared with her cost
of investment. Firms seek information about a worker’s hidden
ability level but can only base their hiring decisions on observable
aributes: her noisy investment signal and groupmembership. e
rm’s response to this informational asymmetry is to update its be-
liefs about a worker’s qualications by drawing on its prior for her
group’s ability levels. erefore, if a rm holds dierent priors for
dierent groups, it will also set dierent hiring thresholds. Further,
since these distinct thresholds are observed and internalized by
workers, they adjust their own investment strategies accordingly—
individuals within the unfavored groupwill lower their investment
levels, and individuals in the favored group will continue to invest
at a high level. Notably, even when the distribution of costs F is
the same for each group1, an asymmetric equilibrium can arise
in which groups invest at dierent levels, further informing rms’
distinct priors. In other words, rational workers and rms best-
respond in ways that exactly conrm the others’ beliefs and strate-
gies, and thus, the discriminatory outcome is “justied.”
is equilibria perspective challenges our mission in designing
constraints to ensure fairness. For one, given that statistical dis-
crimination and machine learning in general rely on data that har-
bor historical inequalities, isolated algorithmic interventions that
do not consider the dynamics of the particular system in which
they are embeddedwill oen fall short of addressing the self-perpetuating
nature of biases. We cannot look forward toward a future of fair-
ness without rst looking backwards at the conditions that have
caused such inequalities. us if the observed outcomes them-
selves are trapped in a feedback loop, fairness constraints should
aim to rst jolt the system out of its current steady-state, and sec-
ond, launch it on a path towards a preferable equilibrium. As such,
a successful approach must consider fairness in situ. is paper
presents a dynamic model that is domain-specic and a fairness
intervention that is system-wide.
In ourmodel, workers invest in human capital, enter rst a Tem-
porary Labor Market (TLM), and then transition into a Permanent
1is has been the standard assumption in the statistical discrimination and labor
economics literature since Arrow [5].
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Labor Market (PLM)2. We use this partition to impose a constraint
on rms’ hiring practices in the TLM that enforces group-fairness.
However, the restriction need not apply in the PLM, and rms nat-
urally select best-response hiring strategies that guarantee individ-
ualworker fairness. Ourmodel of the labormarket is reputational—
a worker carries an individual reputation, which is a history of her
past job performances, and belongs to one of two groups that has
a collective reputation, summarized by the proportion of workers
in the group producing “good” outcomes.
Workingwithin thismodel, we show that by imposing an outcomes-
based fairness constraint on rms’ hiring strategies in the TLM, the
resulting steady-state equilibrium in the PLM is group-symmetric
and Pareto-dominates the PLM asymmetric equilibria that arise
due to either group-blind optimal hiring or statistical discrimina-
tory hiring. Within this model, our fairness intervention is con-
structed to exploit the complementary nature of individual and
collective reputations such that the system produces a feedback
loop that incrementally addresses initial inequalities in group so-
cial standing. As such, our TLM fairness intervention is not permanent—
the guarantee of group-level fairness graduallymorphs into a guar-
antee of individual-level fairness as group equality is restored.
is paper’s application of notions of group-based and individ-
ual fairness to a reputational model of statistical discrimination
in the labor market melds the perspectives and techniques of la-
bor economics with the motivations and framework of algorith-
mic fairness. Our proposed fairness constraints address individual
and group fairness in separate treatments in the labor market that
are nonetheless linked via a complementarity feedback loop. us,
these constraints are aimed at creating system-wide conditions of
fairness that are self-sustaining. As algorithms are increasingly de-
ployed to make employment-related decisions, we hope our work
sheds a light on the equilibriumnature of discriminatory outcomes
and may inform the design and implementation of fairness con-
straints.
In Section 2, we present our model of labor market dynamics
and the imposed fairness constraint. Section 3 contains an overview
of the equilibria results of the model under the fairness require-
ment along with a comparison against equilibria arising from two
rational hiring strategies free from such a constraint. e paper
ends with a reection on the general equilibrium tendencies of dis-
crimination and their implications on the design of fairness con-
straints. We also oer some comments on the dynamic feedback
eects that are inherent features of persistent inequalities and the
challenges they issue upon future work in algorithmic fairness.
1.1 Related Work
Within the algorithmic fairness literature, Zemel et al. [7] address
both group and individual notions of fairness by constructing a
map of agent data to an intermediate layer of clusters that each
preserve statistical parity (ensuring group fairness) while obfuscat-
ing protected aributes. A second mapping to classication based
on cluster assignments then allows “similar” agents to be treated
similarly. is dual-map approach corresponds to our TLM and
2is type of worker movement in a segmented market is common in the labor eco-
nomics literature. Of these, our work shares a structure and purpose most similar to
Kim & Loury [6]. However, notably their model is one of statistical discrimination,
while ours explicitly requires group-fairness.
PLM fairness constraints. Related work has sought distance met-
rics to guide the initial mapping [1], but since criteria for similarity
vary by domain, such general approaches oen face obstacles of
application. We hope that our paper’s concentrated treatment of
dynamics in the labor market addresses this concern. We answer
a call by Friedler et al. [8] to specify a particular world view of
fairness within a domain and classication task. Our model starts
with the important stance of inherent equality between groups. As
such, any indications of dierence in group ability distribution be-
cause of observable investment decisions or outcomes is due to
unequal societal standing, producing myriad secondary eects of
inequality, rather than fundamental dierences in the nature of the
individuals. Following the vocabulary used in Friedler et al., our
model of group dierences in the labor market subscribes to the
axiomatic assumption of “We’re all equal.”
2 MODEL
We disentangle the concerns of group-based and individual fair-
ness by constructing a dual labor market that addresses each no-
tion of fairness independently. A rm’s hiring process in the Tem-
porary Labor Market (TLM) will guarantee group-based fairness;
the mechanisms of the Permanent LaborMarket (PLM) will ensure
individual fairness. While the labor market is divided as a whole,
their dynamics are not separable—workers ow from the TLM to
the PLM, wages are labor-market-wide, and individual worker rep-
utations in the PLM produce externalities for the collective group
reputations that play a key role in individual’s pre-TLM investment
decisions.
2.1 General Setup
Consider a society of n workers who pass through the labor mar-
ket sequentially at times t = 0, 1, .... e labor markets maintain
a constant relative size: m proportion of the workers reside in the
TLM, and 1−m reside in the PLM. Movement is governed by Pois-
son processes—workers immediately replace departing ones in the
TLM, transition from the TLM to the PLM according to the param-
eter κ , and leave the PLM at rate λ.
Each worker belongs to one of two groups µ ∈ {B,W } within
which the distribution of individual abilities is identical, described
by the CDF F (θ). Firms hire and pay workers based on expected
performance, awarding wagew(дt ) for a “good” worker, where дt
gives the proportion of “good”workers in the PLM at time t . is is
formalized by assigning workers to either skilled or unskilled tasks
with distinct wages. us for simplicity, “bad” workers are also
hired but are assigned to the unskilled task and paid awage normal-
ized to 0. e wage premiumw(дt ) is decreasing in дt , since as the
relative supply of “good” workers increases, imperfect worker sub-
stitutability lowers their marginal productivity, thus decreasing
wage. We impose a minimum wage
¯
w such that limдt→∞w(дt ) =
¯
w and a maximum wage w¯ such that limдt→0w(дt ) = w¯ .
2.2 Temporary Labor Market
First, a worker i at time t chooses to invest in human capital ηi > 0
according to the current wage premium w(дt )
3 and her personal
3Workers are boundedly rational and unable to anticipate future wage dynamics.
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cost function for investment, cπ µ
t′
(θi ,ηi ), which is a function of
her individual ability θi
4, group µ “reputation,” π
µ
t ′
where t ′ repre-
sents the time interval [t − τ , t], and selected level of investment
ηi . e collective reputation gives the proportion of “good” work-
ers of group µ in the interval t ′ = [t − τ , t], where the parameter
τ controls the time-lag eect of a group’s previous generations’
reputation on a member’s investment cost in the present. c is de-
creasing in θ , increasing in η, and ∀π
µ
t ′
≤ πν
t ′
, cπ µ
t′
(θi ,ηi ) is a posi-
tive monotonic transformation of cπ ν
t′
(θi ,ηi ). e incorporation of
group membership into an individual’s cost function is informed
by the vast empirical literature that demonstrates the dierential
externalities produced by groups of dierential social standing [9].
Investment in human capital operates as an imperfect signal,
and workers have a hidden true type, qualied or unqualied, ρ ∈
{Q,U }with proportionγQ being qualied, and 1−γQ being unqual-
ied. For investment level η, P(Q |ηi ) ≥ P(Q |η j ),∀ηi > η j . us,
a rm’s TLM hiring strategy is a mapping HT : R
producttext1
{B,W } →
{0, 1} such that the decision for agent i is based only her observed
investment level ηi and group membership µ.
Denition 2.1 (Group Fairness). Ahiring strategyH is group-fair
if and only if for all agents i , the event of i being hired is condition-
ally independent of her group-membership, and thus
P(W ) = P(W |H(i)) and P(B) = P(B |H(i))
Group-fair hiring results in employee representation that satis-
es statistical parity. We impose this fairness constraint on hir-
ing strategies in the TLM, requiring rms to move beyond “group-
blind” practices.
2.3 Permanent Labor Market
Once hired, worker i exerts on-the-job eort e ∈ {H ,L}, which
stochastically produces an observable outcome o ∈ {G,B} that im-
pacts her individual reputation and thus future reward. e = L is
free, but exerting e = H is costly with c(θi , ρ) as a function of
qualication status and ability level. Eort exertion cost functions
here are distinct from the previous investment cost functions—the
former are pertinent to the PLM and dier by qualication status,
whereas the laer relate to the TLM and dier by group member-
ship. Eort ismore costly for unqualied individuals and c(θi ,U ) ≥
c(θi ,Q),∀θ , and high eort increases the probability of a good out-
come G. us if pρ,e gives the probability of achieving outcome
G with qualications ρ and eort level e , we have the following
inequalities
pQ,H > pQ,L ;pU ,H > pU ,L ;pQ,L > pU ,L
Notably pQ,H = pU ,H . Since the eect of qualications on exert-
ing high eort is already incorporated in its cost, we write both
quantities as pH .
A worker keeps the same TLM job until the Poisson process
with parameterκ selects her tomove into the PLM, where rms are
able to observe her history of job outcomes, including her TLMper-
formance. A worker i’s time t history is hti = (oi,1, oi,2, ..., oi,t−1),
a sequence of outcomes that corresponds to her past performances.
Firms are boundedly rational and distill a worker’s past histories
4“Ability” should be broadly interpreted as encapsulating all personal aributes that
bear on success within traditional institutions of education and work.
to her “individual reputation” Πti , which gives the proportion of
outcomes G ∈ hti . A rm’s PLM hiring strategy is a mapping
HP : [0, 1] → {0, 1} such that the decision regarding agent i is
solely a function of Πti . Similar to theHT , the optimalHP is also
based on a threshold strategy such that for a chosen reputation
threshold Πˆt at time t, ∀i such that Πti ≥ Πˆ
t , H(i) = 1, and in-
versely, ∀i such that Πti < Πˆ
t ,H(i) = 0.
Levin [10] also constructs a model of discrimination in which
a worker’s observed individual reputation is driven by eort level
exertions. But we depart from a binary worker’s reputation signal
and conceive of reputation as a history of previous outcomes.
3 RESULTS
3.1 Equilibrium Strategies and Steady-States
Due to feedbacks between individual and collective reputations,
multiple equilibria exist. To focus on a particular equilibrium, we
suppose that rms in the PLM prefer to only hire workers who con-
sistently exert high eort. We start by describing PLM strategies
and then analyze rms’ and workers’ best responses together.
A worker in the PLM is both history-cognizant as well as future-
anticipatory. Agent i’s strategy is a selection of time, reputation,
wage, and hiring threshold-dependent probabilities of eort exer-
tion e(Πti ). e discount factor δ incorporates workers’ present-
bias as well as the possibility of exiting the market via the λ-rate
Poisson process. Her exertion decisions are chosen according to
the expected marginal reward for a G outcome over a B outcome
at time t .
R(θi ,Π
t
i , Πˆ
t
,дt ) = E
[ ∞∑
j=t
(δΦj )
jw(дt ) − (e(Π
j
i − e(Π
j
i −
1
j − 1
))c(θi , ρ)
]
(1)
where Φj = ϕ
(
e(Π
j
i )
)
− ϕ
(
e(Π
j
i −
1
j − 1
)
)
with
ϕ
(
e(Πti )
)
=
t+τ∑
k=
⌈
Πˆ
t+τ
i (t+τ )−Π
t
i t
⌉
(
t + τ
k
)
[e(Πki )pH + (1 − e(Π
k
i )pρ,L)]
k
(2)
∗ [e(Πki )(1 − pH ) + (1 − e(Π
k
i )(1 − pρ,L)]
t+τ−k
We simplify R(θi ,Π
t
i , Πˆ
t ,дt ) to R
∞
t . Φj describes the dynamics of
agent i’s individual reputation as a function of her eort exertion
probability at each possible previous level of reputation, e(Π
j
i ). e
expectation is taken over wage paths w(дt ), and eort exertion is
only warranted if pHR
∞
t − c(θi , ρ) ≥ pρ,LR
∞
t .
In the PLM, if rms wish to hire all and only workers who con-
sistently exert high eort, their equilibrium strategy is to select a
reputation threshold Πˆt = pH ∗ t − ∆(δ ) where ∆(δ ) > 0 is some
small in magnitude function of the discount factor δ . Under the
particular hiring strategy, there will be a steady-state wage w˜ such
that all workers with ability θρ > c
−1
ρ (w˜)will exert eort H even if
their history has “fallen behind” Πˆt . Although immediate reward
is not guaranteed, in the long-run, exertions of eort will be re-
warded.
However, in this setup in which employers observe reputations
Π
t
i of outcomes up to t − 1, workers hold a rst-mover advantage.
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A worker i with reputation Πti −
1
t > Πˆ
t who has secured a job at
time t may nd it protable to exert eort L given that she knows
that she will be hired in the next round regardless of her round t
outcome. us the optimal worker strategy entails exerting eort
in a manner that maintains a reputation exactly oscillating around
the threshold Πˆt . In response, the rm will optimize its hiring
threshold hˆt = pH −∆(δ ) by decreasing ∆ just enough to motivate
consistent high eort from these workers. As δ → 1, ∆ → 0, and
Πˆ
t
= pH such that workers always exert eort if they can aord to
do so. All other workers exert low eort in each round. us at any
time t , given the rm’s reputation threshold Πˆt , its equilibrium
PLM hiring strategy HP is a mapping such that if and only if a
worker i has reputation Πti > Πˆ
t ,HP (i) = 1, elseHP (i) = 0.
Suppose γQ gives the proportion of candidates who are quali-
ed, leaving 1 − γQ who are unqualied. en the proportion of
workers in the PLM who produce good outcomes follows the re-
cursive model
д̂t =pH [1 − F (θ̂Q )γQ − F (θ̂U )(1 − γQ )] + pQ,LF (θ̂Q )γQ (3)
+ pU ,LF (θ̂U )(1 − γQ )
where θ̂ρ = c
−1
ρ (w(дt−1)(pH − pρ,L)) (4)
To determine wage dynamics, we consult TLM strategies before
proceeding to the full equilibrium description.
Since a TLM rm prefers high-ability candidates, optimal hiring
follows a threshold strategy: Given a hiring threshold ηˆ, ∀i such
that ηi ≥ ηˆ,HT (i) = 1, and inversely, ∀i such that ηi < ηˆ,HT (i) =
0.
However, since rms must abide by the group fairness hiring
rule, if a rm aims to hire a fraction ℓ of all workers, investment
thresholds will be implicitly dened and group-specic.
Proposition 1. Taken together, rms’ equilibrium hiring strate-
gies for the TLM and PLM,HT andHP , both satisfy group fairness.
Given the time t TLM investment threshold ηˆ, all workers i with
cπ µ
t′
(θi , ηˆ) ≤ w(дt ) will invest at exactly the level ηi = ηˆ and be
successfully hired, while all other workers will invest at level ηi =
0 and fail to qualify for skilled job positions in the TLM.
Once in the TLM, workers know that their future PLM oppor-
tunities will depend on their observable outcome in the TLM, and
as such they exert eort in a one-shot game. Interestingly, the
one-shot game produces a TLM equilibrium that is equivalent to
its PLM counterpart, and дt , the proportion of workers producing
good outcomes in the TLM, follows the structure of (3) and (4). is
is because a single-shot game imposes the same type of pressure
as does the stringent threshold history hiring strategy in the PLM.
In both, every outcome “counts.”
Having elaborated upon the dynamics of both the TLM and
PLM, we incorporateworker movement and combine the results to
obtain a recursive relationship that governs the equilibrium path
of workers’ performance results, sequence of {дt }
∞
0 , from an ini-
tial wage w0. Note that the multiplicity of possible rm hiring
strategies produces a multiplicity of equilibrium paths, but given
that rms are willing to hire only and all workers who consistently
exert high eort, rm and worker equilibrium strategies are as pre-
viously described, and there exists a unique equilibrium path.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose rms and workers play the following equi-
librium strategies: A rm in the TLM hires a proportionm of workers
under the fairness constraint. A rm’s PLM strategy follows a time-
invariant threshold rule hˆ = pH − ∆(δ ). A worker i of type ρ exerts
eort in the TLM or PLM if and only if c(θi , ρ) ≤ w(дt−1)(pH −pρ,L).
Under the above conditions, the proportion of workers producing
good outcomes at time t follows the recursive relationship
дt = pH [1 − F (θQ )γQ − F (θU )(1 − γQ )] + pQ,LF (θQ )γQ (5)
where θρ = c
−1
ρ (w(дt−1)(pH − pρ,L))
e proportion дt is equal for each group B andW , satisfying group-
fairness throughout the labor market.
Under the TLM fairness constraint, groups with unequal ini-
tial social standing will gradually approach the same reputation
level according to time-lag τ . If the TLM fairness intervention oc-
curs at t = t1, and initially π
B
t1
< πWt1 , the function π
B
t ′ where
t ′ = [t − τ , t] is strictly increasing for all t > t1 until some time
T when πB
T
= πW
T
. e “self-conrming” loop is now co-opted
for group B’s reputation improvement—collective reputation pro-
duces a positive externality, lowering individual group members’
cost functions, thus improving investment conditions for future
workers, further raising individual and group reputation.
We next compare this equilibrium under the TLM group-level
fairness constraintwith equilibria under other rational hiring strate-
gies that are not bound by any notions of fairness and show that un-
der weak conditions, the fairness equilibrium is Pareto-dominant.
3.2 Comparative Statics with Unconstrained
Hiring Strategies
Consider a TLM hiring strategy that is individual-based, operating
under a pure equal-treatment philosophy. A rm hires a propor-
tionq ofworkers by seing an investment level η dened implicitly
as
q = (1 − σB )(1 − F (c
−1
W (η)) + σB (1 − F (c
−1
B (η)) (6)
where σB and 1 − σB give the proportion of individuals in groups
B and W respectively and the function cµ (θ) gives the group µ
investment level function. Writing c−1µ (η) = θ˜µ for µ ∈ {B,W },
these TLM ability thresholds are ranked with respect to the ability
threshold under the fairness constraint θ as θ˜W < θ < θ˜B .
In the PLM, the steady-statewage w˜ enforces thresholds c−1j (w˜) =
θ̂ρ for ρ ∈ {Q,U }. If θ̂Q ∈ [θ, θ˜B ]
5, then asymmetric equilibria in
which group reputations π µ dier may arise. Firms’ TLM hiring
strategies inequitably bound the proportion of high-ability work-
ers in group B who are eligible to compete for jobs in the PLM,
thus maintaining the reputation gap and dierences in group in-
vestment costs, producing the “self-conrming” equilibrium eect.
Further, since 1 − Fд(θ̂ρ ) < 1 − Ff (θ̂ρ ) where Fд and Ff are the
ability CDFs under the “group-blind” and fair regime respectively,
rms that demand more workers strictly prefer the equilibria un-
der the fairness constraint. is is because the eective higher abil-
ity threshold for group B under this “group-blind” TLM strategy
is inecient, leaving behind an untapped resource of skilled and
5θ̂Q > θ is not a stringent requirement since it is expected that the PLM threshold
is higher than the TLM threshold, else allQ workers would be hired at equilibrium.
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qualied individuals who would have otherwise been hired in the
PLM. Even the hired workers in groupW who are not hired in the
fair regime do not fare beer, since all such workers have ability
level lower than the PLM reputation threshold and are not hired at
equilibrium anyway.
Firms may also select hiring strategies that use statistical dis-
crimination, in which priors regarding a worker’s observable at-
tributes (such as group membership) are used to infer a particular
individual’s hidden aributes. However, when groups face dier-
ing underlying investment cost functions, rms that statistically
discriminate may push the system toward Pareto-dominated equi-
libria similar in kind to the asymmetric equilibria in the “group-
blind” case.
In particular, if TLM rms hold priors ξB and ξW about the two
groups’ capabilities, upon observing an agent’s groupmembership
µ and investment level v , they will update their beliefs according
to:
P(S |µ,v) =
pS (v)ξµ
pS (v)ξµ + (1 − ξµ )pU (v)
(7)
where pS (v) and pU (v) gives the probability of a skilled and un-
skilled worker having investment level v respectively.
If ξW > ξB , then P(S |W ,v) > P(S |B,v), and the groups face
dierent incentive compatibility constraints. As Coate & Loury
[11] show, self-conrming asymmetric equilibria also exist under
this regime, and lower investment levels within the group with
lower social standing are justied by rms’ more stringent hiring
standards. ese TLM choices have ramications in the PLM that
mirror the Pareto-dominated results under “group-blind” hiring.
4 DISCUSSION
Given the specic nature of demands in fairness, domain-specic
approaches lend themselves to beer modeling of the impact an
intervention can make on a particular ecosystem. Describing un-
fair outcomes in employment as caused by rational agent best-
response strategies suggests that the eld of algorithmic fairness
should consider the labor market’s inherent dynamic seing in its
approach to potential interventions. Fairness constraints that are
conceived as isolated procedural checks have a limited capacity to
install system-wide fairness that may be self-sustained and long-
lasting. e problem of fairness is fundamentally tied to historicity.
Within all societal domains in which fairness is an issue, past and
current social relations dierentially impact subjects, producing
distinct sets of resources, options, and opportunities that continue
to mark agents’ choices and outcomes today. is fact presents a
challenge for the standard learning theory formulation of the prob-
lem in which agent aributes are treated as a priori givens rather
than themselves the products of a lineage of previous social choices
and conditions. A dynamic model recognizes the powerful ripple
eect of the past and calls for a fairness intervention that carries
momentum into the future. e labor market as a source of eco-
nomic opportunity is ripe with positive externalities and is thus
an ideal seing for a notion of fairness that is oriented toward a
future beyond the short timeline of rm hiring cycles. We argue
that fairness conceived in this way is a project that aims to achieve
group egalitarianism—an ambition that is not only a worthy goal
in itself but one that we show is also socially optimal.
Our model of individual reputations as a sequence of previous
outcomes in the PLMtswithin the hiring process regime today, in
which employers have increased access to worker data. Since algo-
rithms will be largely responsible for making sense of this individ-
ual historical data, future work should consider interventions that
are able to si through a worker’s historical data and determine
whether a group-based fairness constraint, such as the one consid-
ered in this paper in the TLM, should be imposed, or whether a
PLM individual-based hiring decision will suce. Beyond serving
eciency, such practices should protect fairness.
e entry of algorithms into hiring must grapple with a long
tradition of explicit and implicit human biases that have rendered
the labor market prone to discriminatory practices. We hope that
this work can suggest ways that algorithmic fairness interventions
can shi hiring strategies towards a beer, fairer future.
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